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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On December 26, 1996, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge, Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, entered his ORDER ON MONTFORD-
APOLLO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT GUY L. 
THOMAS AND MR. THOMAS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER. A 
true and correct copy of that order, as docketed in the Third District Court, appears as Exhibit 
"A" of the addendum. 
Among other things, the order denied Montford-Apollo's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granted Mr. Thomas' Motion for Leave to Amend his Answer. However, the 
court; 
. . . conditioned] its grant of Mr. Thomas' Request for Leave to 
Amend upon Mr. Thomas' payment, to Montford-Apollo, of the sum of 
Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) attorneys' fees incurred by 
Montford-Apollo in responding to Mr. Thomas' Request for Leave to 
Amend, and the additional sum of Five Thousand Four Hundred 
Eighty-Eight Dollars ($5,488.00) attorneys' fees incurred by Montford-
Apollo in preparing, briefing, filing, and arguing the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, including the fees incurred in preparing [the] order 
and the affidavit of Robert S. Young with respect thereto. The 
foregoing represents the amounts identified in the Affidavit of Robert 
S. Young, by this reference incorporated herein, which would not have 
been incurred by Montford-Apollo had Mr. Thomas raised the issue of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prior to Montford-
Apollo's filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
See Exhibit "A" of the addendum at page 4. 
By petition dated January 15, 1997, Mr. Thomas, through counsel, sought 
permission from this court to appeal the foregoing order on an interlocutory basis. On its 
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own motion, this court, by order dated February 25, 1997, transferred Mr. Thomas' Petition 
for Permission to Appeal on an Interlocutory Basis to the Utah Supreme Court under the 
provisions of Rule 44 of the Utah R.Civ.P.. In its order, the Court of Appeals noted the 
original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under the provisions of Section 78-
2-2(3)G)(Supp. 1996). 
In June 1997, the Utah Supreme Court granted Mr. Thomas' Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal and poured-over the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition. 
V, STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
Montford-Apollo agrees with issues number 1 and 2 of Mr. Thomas' Statement of 
Issues on Review. However, Mr. Thomas raises issue No. 3 for the first time on appeal and 
does not cite any portion of the record establishing that issue No. 3 was properly preserved 
for appeal. "Issues not raised [in the trial court] cannot be raised on appeal. This general rule 
applies equally to constitutional issues, with the limited exception of where a person's liberty 
is at stake." Pratt v. City Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-4 (Utah 1981). 
Accordingly, since Mr. Thomas' liberty is not at stake, Montford-Apollo respectfully asks 
this court to reject his arguments asserting a denial of the equal protection of the laws since 
they are raised for the first time on this appeal. 
The standard of review is set forth in several decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. 
In Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court noted that an 
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"award of attorneys' fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion." Id. at 1110. 
Moreover, as recently as 1993, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the fact that "when 
reviewing an award of attorneys' fees, we will affirm the trial court's ruling absent an abuse 
of discretion." Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, 
Montford-Apollo disputes Mr. Thomas' contention that the standard of review herein is de 
novo. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The issues herein are narrowly confined to whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding Montford-Apollo its attorneys' fees incurred in preparing, briefing, 
filing and arguing a Motion for Summary Judgment and whether the amount awarded was 
reasonable. Montford-Apollo respectfully suggests the following facts are essential to an 
understanding of the context from which the court rendered its decision. 
1. On June 9, 1996, Montford-Apollo served its First Requests for Admission, 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents upon Mr. Thomas' counsel. 
2. As of August 15, 1996, Mr. Thomas had failed to respond to the discovery 
request and counsel for Montford-Apollo, as noted in Exhibit "C" of the addendum, reminded 
Mr. Thomas, through counsel, of the belated response and of Montford-Apollo's intent to 
seek "summary judgment, based upon the admission of each of the Requests for Admission 
contained in [the] July 9 discovery request, if [Mr. Thomas did] not respond to the discovery 
within the next ten days." 
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3. Despite the reminder1, Mr. Thomas did not respond and by Motion dated 
September 26, 1996, Montford-Apollo sought the trial court's Order granting summary 
judgment against him due, in part, to his failure to respond to the July 9, 1996 discovery. 
4. In his October 9, 1996 Memorandum Opposing the Motion, Mr. Thomas 
contended for the first time, "[a] material fact exists as to whether [Montford-Apollo] 
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing when [Montford-Apollo] allowed Moxie [an 
alleged competitor] to rent the space next to the space occupied by [Mr. Thomas]." 
5. In its October 23, 1996 Reply Memorandum, Montford-Apollo argued, 
among other things, under Rule 12(h) Utah R.Civ.P., "Mr. Thomas' failure to raise the issue 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing until the time of responding to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment amounts to a waiver of that defense." 
6. Thereafter, by pleading dated November 26, 1996, Mr. Thomas "requested] 
leave to amend his answer to the Complaint pursuant to Rule 15 Utah R.Civ.P.," to allege 
Montford-Apollo's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
7. On the same date, November 26, 1996, approximately four and one-half 
months after they were served, Mr. Thomas first responded to Montford-Apollo's Requests 
for Admission, Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents. 
8. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted that portion of 
Montford-Apollo's Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a ruling that Montford-Apollo's 
lNo Rule of Civil Procedure requires the reminder and Montford-Apolio did so only as a courtesy to Mr. 
Thomas and his counsel. 
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Requests for Admission were deemed admitted, in accordance with the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985). 
9. The trial court also granted Mr. Thomas' request for leave to amend his 
Answer to the Complaint, permitting him to raise the issue of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. However, as noted above, the trial court: 
. . . conditioned] its grant of Mr. Thomas' request. . . upon Mr. 
Thomas' payment, to Montford-Apollo, of the sum of $350 attorneys' 
fees incurred by Montford-Apollo in responding to Mr. Thomas' 
request for leave to amend, and the additional sum of $5,488 attorneys' 
fees incurred by Montford-Apollo in preparing, briefing, filing, and 
arguing the Motion for Summary Judgment, including the fees incurred 
in preparing [the] Order and the Affidavit of Robert S. Young with 
respect thereto. 
Judge Iwasaki further explained his decision noting "[t]he foregoing represents the 
amounts identified in the affidavit of Robert S. Young . . . which would not have been 
incurred by Montford-Apollo had Mr. Thomas raised the issue of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing prior to Montford-Apollo's filing of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment." 
10. Conditioned on the foregoing, the court denied Montford-Apollo's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
With this brief Montford-Apollo seeks affirmation of the trial court's order 
awarding it partial attorneys' fees in connection with the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Absent Mr. Thomas' belated response to discovery (establishing the admission of certain 
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critical facts) and his failure to assert a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing until he responded to the motion for summary judgment, Montford-Apollo would 
never have incurred the attorneys' fees associated with the motion. 
Montford-Apollo's argument also focuses on Utah law providing that an award of 
attorneys' fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. In this instance, the trial 
court's discretion could have resulted in a ruling, at one extreme, granting Montford-Apollo's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The court could have granted the motion based upon the 
facts deemed admitted due to Mr. Thomas' failure to respond to discovery and his waiver of 
the defense of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to raise it in his 
answer. At the other extreme, the trial court could have allowed Mr. Thomas to amend his 
Complaint (to assert the defense of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing) and simply denied Montford-Apollo's Motion for Summary Judgment. In so 
ordering, the court would have rendered all for naught the attorneys' fees incurred by 
Montford-Apollo with respect to the motion. 
In ruling as it did, the trial court appears to have endeavored to reach a middle 
ground. That middle ground allowed Mr. Thomas to amend his answer to assert the new 
affirmative defense, but conditioned the assertion of the new defense on Mr. Thomas' 
payment of the attorneys' fees incurred by Montford-Apollo in preparing a Motion for 
Summary Judgment that the court was probably compelled to grant, in the absence of the 
new defense. 
6 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT MAY, AND SHOULD, AFFIRM THE 
TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES 
ON ANY PROPER GROUND. 
Neither in the order that is the subject of this appeal, nor in the minute entry,2 did 
the trial court clearly delineate the basis for its award of attorneys' fees. Thus, the trial court's 
reasoning in allowing the award is not precisely clear. Irrespective of the reasoning, and 
regardless of whether the trial court's reasoning may be right or wrong, this court may affirm 
the award on any proper ground. As this court has observed, "we may affirm the trial court's 
determination on any proper ground, notwithstanding the trial court's having based its ruling 
on another reason." Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah 
App. 1993), citing Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
Montford-Apollo agrees generally with the arguments and authority of Mr. 
Thomas' brief, wherein he contends that Utah law allows recovery of attorneys' fees only by 
statute or contract. Estate ofQuinn, 830 P.2d 282, 284 (Utah App. 1992). In addition to the 
general rule, however, Utah courts have long been authorized, if not required, under Rule 37 
Utah R.Civ.P., to sanction a party's failure to make or cooperate in discovery by, among other 
things, awarding attorneys' fees. 
Rule 37(b)(2) allows the court, as a sanction for failure to make or cooperate in 
discovery, to enter orders including: 
2True and correct copies of each are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" of the addendum. 
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(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from 
introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient par ty . . . . 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the 
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney 
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney 
fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
Rule 37(b)(2), Utah R.Civ.P., (emphasis supplied). 
Accordingly, in this proceeding, there are at least two bases upon which the court 
could have awarded attorneys fees. First, the agreement between Montford-Apollo and Mr. 
Thomas contemplated the recovery of attorneys1 fees by the successful party in any litigation. 
Page 28 of the Lease Agreement contains the following provision:3 
In the event that either the Landlord or the Tenant shall institute 
any action or proceeding against the other relating to the provisions of 
this Lease, or any default hereunder, then, and in that event, the 
unsuccessful party in such action or proceeding agrees to reimburse the 
successful party for the reasonable expenses of such action including 
reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred therein by the 
successful party. 
In his appeal brief, Mr. Thomas contends an award of attorneys' fees under the 
lease provision is inappropriate because "until this matter is brought to a final disposition in 
the lower court, any determination of attorneys' fees . . . would be premature and contrary to 
3A copy of the Attorneys' Fee provision is attached as Exhibit "D" of the addendum. 
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the terms of the Lease Agreement...." Brief at 8. As noted above, however, Rule 37 
contemplates attorneys' fee awards before final disposition. Hence, the trial court was within 
its legal authority in ordering Mr. Thomas to "pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney fees, caused by the failure . . . " to respond to discovery. 
In W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. ViL, 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), the trial 
court proceeded similarly to the trial court herein. "The trial court ruled that pursuant to Rule 
37(d), Utah R.Civ.P., a judgment by default should be entered against defendant on the 
ground of defendant's persistent failure to respond timely or properly to discovery requests." 
Id. at 736. "The [trial] court also entered a summary judgment against defendant, because the 
pleadings, admissions,4 affidavits on file showed there to be no genuine issue of any material 
facts; [sic] and plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (Emphasis 
supplied). In W. W. & W.B. Gardner, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
actions. Montford-Apollo asks this court to do the same herein. 
POINT II 
THE MIDDLE GROUND THE TRIAL COURT ATTEMPTED 
TO ACHIEVE CANNOT AMOUNT TO AN ABUSE OF ITS 
DISCRETION. 
In this case, it is rather apparent that Montford-Apollo was in a position to bring 
this matter to a final conclusion unless the trial court granted Mr. Thomas' Motion for Leave 
4The Supreme Court acknowledged Defendant's contention, on appeal, that "there were material issues of 
fact in dispute which would preclude summary judgment." Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also noted 
"through a series of requests for admissions plaintiff established the requisite facts... . Defendant belatedly 
responded to the admissions but under Rule 36(a), U.R.C.P., the matters were deemed admitted when defendant 
failed to answer or object within 30 days after service." 
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to Amend. As in W. W. & W.B. Gardner, in this case, absent leave to amend Mr. Thomas' 
Answer, "the pleadings, admissions, affidavits on file showed there to be no genuine issue of 
any material facts and [Montford-Apollo] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The 
requests for admission, and the facts deemed admitted under Rule 36(a) Utah R.Civ.P. due to 
Mr. Thomas' failure to respond, include the following: 
Request for Admission No. 1: Admit that Exhibit "A" attached 
is a true and correct copy of the Lease Assignment/Lease Extension 
Agreement, dated April 26, 1994, by, between and among Sugarhouse 
Development Partnership, The Brown Bear International Corporation 
and you. 
Request for Admission No. 2: Admit your signature appears on 
Exhibit "A" attached. 
Request for Admission No. 3: Admit that Exhibit "B" attached 
is a true and correct copy of the Lease Agreement, dated January 21, 
1993, by and between Sugarhouse Development Partnership and The 
Brown Bear International Corporation and to which reference is made 
in Exhibit "A" attached, the Lease Assignment/Lease Extension 
Agreement. 
Request for Admission No. 4: Admit that Exhibit "C" attached, 
titled "Exhibit 'A' Guarantee of Lease," is a true and correct copy of the 
Guarantee you signed at the time of signing the Lease 
Assignment/Lease Extension Agreement, dated April 26, 1994, by, 
between and among Sugarhouse Development Partnership, The Brown 
Bear International Corporation and you. 
Request for Admission No. 5: Admit your signature appears on 
Exhibit "C" attached. 
Request for Admission No. 6: Admit that Exhibit "D" attached 
is a true and correct copy of the Lease Amendment, dated October 25, 
1994, between Montford-Apollo and you. 
Request for Admission No. 7: Admit your signature appears on 
Exhibit "D" attached. 
Request for Admission No. 8: Admit you have failed to pay rent 
and other obligations due Montford-Apollo, under the Lease 
Agreement, since July 1995. 
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Request for Admission No. 9: Admit you received the original 
of Exhibit "E" attached, the David Broadbent letter of March 4, 1996, 
on or about March 4, 1996. 
Request for Admission No. 10: Admit, despite your failure to 
pay rent since July 1995, you did not vacate the premises, at the 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center, until after receiving a copy of Exhibit 
"E" attached, the David Broadbent letter of March 4, 1996. 
Request for Admission No. 11: Admit you never requested, nor 
discussed with Montford-Apollo, an exclusive right to sell espresso in 
the Sugarhouse Shopping Center. 
Request for Admission No. 12: Admit that among Exhibits "A" 
through "D" attached, there is no provision purporting to give you an 
exclusive right to sell, or to prevent others from selling, espresso in the 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center. 
i 
Mr. Thomas' failure to respond to the foregoing requests for admission established 
at least the following: (1) the true and correct nature of the lease documents on which 
Montford-Apollo relied in asserting a breach of contract; (2) Mr. Thomas' signature on each 
of those documents; (3) Mr. Thomas' failure to pay rent and other obligations due Montford-
Apollo, under the Lease Agreement, since July 1995; (4) Mr. Thomas failure to vacate the 
premises until after March 4, 1996; and (5) Mr. Thomas' lack of any exclusive right to sell 
espresso coffee in the Sugarhouse Shopping Center. With the foregoing facts established, 
Montford-Apollo was certainly entitled to summary judgment absent the court's willingness 
to allow Mr. Thomas to amend his Complaint to assert a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing as an affirmative defense. 
Apparently recognizing the difficulty of his situation, Mr. Thomas argued that 
Montford-Apollo had violated a covenant of good faith and fair dealing by allowing an alleged 
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competitor, Moxie Java, to rent the space next door.5 In its reply memorandum, Montford-
Apollo contended Mr. Thomas' prior failure to allege Montford-Apollo's violation of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing amounted to a waiver of that defense under Rule 12(h) 
Utah R.Civ.P. Those arguments having been made, it is evident the trial court could have ruled, 
at one extreme, that Mr. Thomas had waived any defense alleging Montford-Apollo's violation of 
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing and entered summary judgment against Mr. Thomas for 
the full amount of all obligations unpaid under the lease. 
At the other extreme, the trial court could have ruled that Mr. Thomas was entitled to 
amend his answer to allege Montford-Apollo's violation of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. In so ruling, the trial court would have rendered all for naught, Montford-
Apollo's efforts in researching, preparing, filing, arguing and preparing orders with respect to its 
Motion for Summary Judgement. Clearly, Montford-Apollo's Motion for Summary Judgement 
was well-taken in the absence of Mr. Thomas' allegation that Montford-Apollo had breached a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, at one extreme Montford-Apollo would have been 
entitled to summary judgment against Mr. Thomas, and the litigation as to him would have come 
to an end. At the other extreme, Mr. Thomas would have been entitled to simply amend his 
answer, rendering all for naught the efforts of Montford-Apollo in bringing the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
5Since Mr. Thomas first raised the issue of an alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing after the filing of Montford-Apollo's Motion for Summary Judgment, Montford-Apollo found itself 
somewhat ill-prepared to respond. Montford-Apollo has since informed counsel the lease with Moxie Java was 
entered with Sugar House Development Partnership, the owner of the shopping center prior to Montford-Apollo's 
acquisition. Accordingly, Mr. Thomas' claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
irrespective of their merit, lie against Sugar House Development Partnership, not Montford-Apollo. 
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Undoubtedly, the court attempted to strike a balance between the two extremes, 
granting Mr. Thomas leave to amend his answer to assert Montford-Apollo's alleged violation of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but conditioning that ruling on Mr. Thomas' payment 
to Montford-Apollo of the attorneys' fees incurred in preparing, arguing and filing its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In ruling as it did, the trial court permitted Mr. Thomas to assert his new 
defense without rendering all for naught Montford-Apollo's efforts to pursue a Motion for 
Summary Judgment that was clearly well-taken. The trial court's attempts to strike a balance 
between two extremes, in terms of the rulings it could have made, simply do not amount to an 
abuse of discretion. Based upon the foregoing, Montford-Apollo respectfully submits the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the attorneys' fees it did and seeks this court's 
order affirming the award. 
POINT III 
THE ATTORNEYS1 FEES AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
WERE REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
As noted in Exhibit "A" to the addendum, the trial court determined the 
reasonableness of the attorneys1 fees award, at least in part, based upon the Affidavit of 
Robert S. Young. The court incorporated the affidavit, by reference, in its order. That 
Affidavit, included in Exhibit "A" of the addendum to this brief, reveals, among other things, 
that Mr. Young specifically reviewed the billing records of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler to 
determine that he devoted 39.2 hours to all aspects of the Motion for Summary Judgment. At 
Mr. Young's then billing rate of $140 per hour, the amount Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
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charged Montford-Apollo, for services rendered in connection with the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, was $5,488 
Mr. Thomas offers no explanation, and certainly no expert testimony, as to why 
the foregoing amount is unreasonable. He merely declares it to be so. Montford-Apollo 
submits the amount awarded is the amount it paid, in accordance with the time devoted by its 
counsel to bring the motion, and there is nothing unreasonable about the time devoted to the 
matter in the context of this proceeding as outlined in the Affidavit of Mr. Young. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees finds support both in the facts and the law 
relevant to this dispute. In rendering that award, the trial court sought merely to achieve a 
medium ground and did not abuse its discretion in that effort. The award is reasonable, under 
the circumstances of this proceeding, and should be affirmed. Montford-Apollo respectfully 
requests this court's decision so ordering. 
Dated this day of May 1998. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By_ -Z9 «T 
Robert S. Y o u n £ V X 
Attorneys for Montfiard/Agollo J 
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X. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the Jj_ day of May 1998,1 delivered for filing with the Utah 
Court of Appeals, as required by Rule 26(b) Utah R.App.P., an original and seven copies, and 
mailed to the individuals noted below, by first-class mail postage prepaid, one copy, of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND INTERLOCUTORY APPELLEE. 
Robert L. Booker, Esq. 
Booker & Associates 
New England Plaza, Suite 550 
349 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Kent Holland, Esq. 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643 
$WnT~— 
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XL ADDENDUM 
1. Exhibit "A" - The December 26, 1996 ORDER ON MONTFORD-APOLLO'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT GUY L. THOMAS AND 
MR. THOMAS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER as docketed in the Third 
Judicial District Court, including a copy of the Affidavit of Robert S. Young, incorporated 
therein by reference and filed in support of the reasonableness of the attorneys' fee award. 
2. Exhibit "B" - The Court's December 9, 1996 MINUTE ENTRY as docketed in 
the Third Judicial District Court following the hearing on the Motion. 
3. Exhibit "C" - A copy of the letter from counsel for Montford-Apollo to counsel 
for Mr. Thomas, dated August 15, 1996, warning that Mr. Thomas' response to Montford-
Apollo's First Requests for Admission, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, served July 9, 1996, was past due and advising of Montford-Apollo's intent "to 
move for summary judgment, based upon the admission of each of the Requests for Admission 
contained in [Montford-Apollo's] July 9 discovery request, if [Mr. Thomas did] not respond to 
the discovery within the next ten days." 
4. Exhibit "D" - A copy of the Attorneys' fees provision of page 28 of the Lease. 
G \PEGGY\RSY\MONTFORD 396\APEALBRF 513 
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PRINCE, YEATES Sc GELDZAHLER 
Robert S. Young, USB #4174 
David K. Broadbent, USB #0442 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Deputy ClCffc. 
P«(NCC Y£ATCS 
* QCLOZAHLCR 
2ty GeoU6 1, Sulto 900 
I7S C«3t Fourth South 
Salt Lako Oty 
Utah 64U1 
(801) 524 1000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONTFORD-APOLLO SUGARHOUSE L.P. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE BROWN BEAR INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
MICHAEL BROWN, an individual, and 
GUY L. THOMAS, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MONTFORD-APOLLO'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT GUY L. 
THOMAS AND MR. THOMAS1 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
HIS ANSWER 
Case No. 960902088 CN 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
By motion dated September 26, 1996, Montford-Apollo Sugarhouse 
L.p. ("Montford-Apollo") , moved the court for Summary Judgment against 
defendant Guy L. Thomas ("Mr. Thomas"). In response to the motion, 
Mr. Thomas, among other things, by pleading dated November 26, 1996, 
requested "leave to amend his answer to the complaint pursuant to Rule 
15 of the Utah Rules ol Civil Procedure" to assert a defense not 
EXHIBIT A 
Page ^ of ^ 
/ 
PfUNCC, YCATCS 
t QELOZAHLCR 
Oly Contra I. Sullo 900 
175 Cast fount* South 
Sa1\ lako CUy 
Utah 8<1U 
(801) S?< 10'JO 
previously asserted - a defense alleging that Montford-Apollo had 
breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The parties appeared before the court on December 9, 1996, at 
11:00 a.m. , for oral argument. Montford-Apollo appeared through its 
counsel, Robert S. Young. Mr. Thomas appeared through his counsel J. 
Kent Holland. Robert L. Booker, counsel for Michael Brown and the 
Brown Bear International Corporation, also attended though his clients 
did not participate in the proceedings. The court, having considered 
the motions, having reviewed the memoranda filed and considered the 
arguments made by counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, hereby: 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES 
1. By motion dated September 26, 1996, Montford-Apollo sought 
this court's order granting summary judgment against Mr. Thomas due, in 
part, to Mr. Thomas' failure to respond to certain Requests for 
Admission dated July 9, 1996 and placed in the mail, for service upon 
Mr. Thomas' counsel, on that date. 
2. Mr. Thomas defends against the motion for summary judgment 
contending, for the first time in his October 9, 1996 Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment [sic] , " [a] material fact exists as to whether 
Plaintiff breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing when 
Plaintiff allowed Moxie to rent the space next to the space occupied by 
[Mr. Thomas]." 
EXHIBIT _ J , 
Paae 2 of W 
PfUNCC, YCATES 
* GCLOZAHLCR 
C CttyGontro I, SuUoSOO 
T 175 Cast fourth South 
Utah 64111 
(801) S?< 1000 
3. By Reply Memorandum, dated October 23, 1996, Montford-
Apollo contends, among other things, under Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, "Mr. Thomas1 failure to raise the issue of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing until the time of 
responding to a motion for summary judgment amounts to a waiver of that 
defense." 
4. By pleading dated November 26, 1996, Mr. Thomas "requests 
leave to amend his answer to the complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," to raise the issue of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
5. On the same date, November 26, 1996, approximately four and 
one-half months after they were served, Mr. Thomas first responded to 
Montford-Apollo's Requests for Admission, Interrogatories, and Requests 
for Production of Documents. 
6. The court grants that portion of Montford-Apollo's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, seeking a ruling that Montford-Apollo's Requests 
for Admission are deemed admitted, in accordance with the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. , 7 02 
P.2d 98, 100 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, for purposes of this 
proceeding, the truth of each matter that is the subject of Montford-
Apollo's Requests for Admission is conclusively established and deemed 
admitted, irrespective of Mr. Thomas' responses thereto. 
7. The court further grants Mr. Thomas' request for leave to 
amend his answer to the complaint, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah 
- 3 -
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Rules of Civil Procedure, to raise the issue of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. The court, however, conditions its grant 
of Mr. Thomas1 request for leave to amend upon Mr. Thomas1 payment, to 
Montford-Apollo, of the sum of $3 50 attorneys1 fees incurred by 
Montford-Apollo in responding to Mr. Thomas' request for leave to 
amend, and the additional sum of $5,488 attorneys1 fees incurred by 
Montford-Apollo in preparing, briefing, filing, and arguing the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, including the fees incurred in preparing this 
Order and the Affidavit of Robert S. Young with respect thereto. The 
foregoing represents the amounts identified in the affidavit of Robert 
S. Young, by this reference incorporated herein, which would not have 
been incurred by Montford-Apollo had Mr. Thomas raised the issue of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing prior to Montford-
Apollo' s filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8. Except as expressly noted above, the court denies the 
motions of the parties, .o 
DATED this C > ^ day of Dz 1996 
n o r a b l e Glenn K. I w a s a k i 
G : \DIANE\RSY\M0NTFORD 3 9G \ORDRSU>'iJ .D09 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the j ^ day of December, 1996, I mailed 
to the individual noted below, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MONT FORD-APOLLO1 S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT GUY L. THOMAS AND MR. 
THOMAS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER: 
Robert L. Booker, Esq. 
Booker & Associates 
New England Plaza, Suite 550 
34 9 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and by hand-delivery to the individual noted below: 
J. Kent Holland, Esq. 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643 
G : \DIANE\RSY\MONTFORD. 39€\ORDRSUKJ . D09 
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PRINCE, YCATCS 
4 QCLOZAMLER 
Uy Centre t. Suite 900 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Robert S. Young, USB #4174 
David K. Broadbent, USB #0442 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONTFORD-APOLLO SUGARHOUSE L.P., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE BROWN BEAR INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
MICHAEL BROWN, an individual, and 
GUY L. THOMAS, an individual, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT S. YOUNG 
IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT»S 
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS1 
FEES TO MONTFORD-APOLLO ON 
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960902088CN 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
PRINCE, YEATES 
4 GELDZAHLER 
in> Cormo t. Suite 900 
75 Cast Tourth South 
Sad Lako City 
Utah 84111 
(801)5?4 1000 
Robert S. Young, being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of 
Utah. 
2. I currently practice with the firm of Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler, who Montford-Apollo has retained to represent its interest 
in this proceeding. 
3. Following the Court's recent Order, awarding Montford-Apollo 
its attorney's fees incurred in connection with the preparation, 
filing, and argument related to its Motion foi Summary Judgment against 
EXHIBIT _ A _ — 
Pans k of 1* -
Guy L. Thomas, I have reviewed the monthly statements supplied by 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler to Montford-Apollo, for the months of 
August through November 1996. True and correct copies of those 
statements are attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
4. In reviewing the monthly statements supplied to Montford-
Apollo, I have reviewed each entry to determine whether the services 
rendered were related to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. I have marked those entries related to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment with either the letter "A" or "P." The letter "A" 
identifies those time entries where all of the efforts listed in the 
entry relate to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The letter "P" 
identifies those time entries where only a part of the entry relates to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment. I made no mark on those entries 
unrelated to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6. My review of the records reveals that the time entries, 
wherein all of the work related to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
total 29.2 hours. The time entries where part of the work related to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment total eight hours. 
7. I believe that a fair adjustment for the time entries, 
wherein only part of the services relates to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, would be a 50% reduction. Therefore, I have included four of 
the eight hours partially related to the Motion for Summary Judgment in 
my calculation of fees. 
PRINCE, YEATES 
& GELOZAHLER 
;<ty Contre l , S u i t o 9 0 0 
75 East Tourtr i South 
Sal* Lake City 
Utah 8^111 
(801)b?A 1000 
- 2 -
EXHS31T A 
Pana 7 of tf 
8. Accordingly, I have concluded that I devoted approximately 
33.2 hours to research, drafting, review and revision, and all other 
matters related to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, since 
the November statement, I have devoted approximately six hours to 
preparing for and arguing the Motion for Summary Judgment, preparing 
the Court%s Order with respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
reviewing the Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler billing statements and 
preparing the Affidavit of Robert S. Young related to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
9. Thus, the total time I have devoted to Montford-Apollo' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment against Guy Thomas is 39.2 hours. At my 
billing rate of $14 0 per hour, the amount we have charged, or will 
charge, Montford-Apollo for services rendered in connection with the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, is $5,488, excluding costs incurred in 
connection therewith. 
10. In view of our efforts and the hours spent to file both 
initial and reply memoranda in support of the Motion, to research the 
application of Utah law under the circumstances of this case, to review 
and revise the memoranda before filing with the court, and to prepare 
the Order and Affidavit applicable to the Motion, I affirm the 
reasonableness of the fees charged our client to obtain comparable 
legal services in this community. 
PRJNCE, YEATES 
& GELDZAHLER 
^ty Contro I, Suite 900 
i75 East Fourth South 
Sail Lako Cu> 
Utah 84H1 
(801)524 1000 
- 3 - EXHIBIT A 
of 
Dated this /3 day of December, 1996. 
Robert S 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ 3. day of December, 1996. 
£JLl<Os7<j> WAjJU&OecA 
****«**——, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res _ _ 
**•«•• •••••^.^ My Commission Exp 
• 1 
i d i n g a t : fiiAitsrxhLiJjjT 
C is on i r e s : V «?-/3-2~/3-?7 
PRINCE, YEATES 
& GELDZAHLER 
,ity Contro « Suite 900 
75 East Fourth South 
Salt Lak-o City 
U'ah 84111 
(801)52< 1000 
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JS East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
(801)524 1000 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the \ ^ day of December, 1996, I mailed 
to the individual noted below, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT S. YOUNG IN 
SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO MONTFORD-
APOLLO ON ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Robert L. Booker, Esq. 
Booker & Associates 
New England Plaza, Suite 550 
349 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and by hand-delivery to the individual noted below: 
J. Kent Holland, Esq. 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643 
G \DIANE\RSY\MONTFORD 396\AFFIDRSY D12 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH - SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Telephone-801/524-1000 
Page 
Inv# 
Date 
011653 
1 
-043610 
8/31/96 
000006-DKB 
MONTFORD-APOLLO SUGAR HOUSE LP 
% WESTFIELD PROPERTIES INC 
2681 E PARLEYS WAY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109 
Re: THOMAS, GUY L 
8/08/96 RSY 
8/09/96 RSY 
8/12/96 RSY 
1/ 13/96 RSY 
8/ 1 5/96 RSY 
8 /JO/ 9 (> 
EXHIBIT 
Paoe 
RSY 
A 
HOURS AMOUNT 
TELE CONF WITH KRAIG ERICKSON RE STATUS 
OF LITIGATION. REVIEW FILE TO 
DETERMINE RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY DUE ON 
AUGUST 12, 1996. REVISE RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8 RE AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIP. TELE CONF WITH PHILIP 
MONTGOMERY RE SIGNATURE. 
REVISE REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8. 
PREPARE LETTERS TO PHILIPMONTGOMERY AND 
KENT HOLLAND RE SAME. TELE CONF WITH 
TO JANET BANKS RE POTENTIAL TO 
RESCHEDULE SEPTEMBER 9 HEARING. 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW MIKE BROWN'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT. 
TELE CONF WITH JANET BANKS RE CHANGE IN 
HEARING DATE TO SEPTEMBER 23. TELE 
CONF WITH ROBERT BOOKER'S OFFICE RE 
SAME . 
TELE CONFS WITH JANET BANKS AND WITH 
HILDA OF ROBERT BOOKER'S OFFICE RE 
RESCHEDULED HEARING ON MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT. PREPARE AMENDED NOTICE 
OF HEARING. 
PREPARE LETTER TO KENT 
DISCOVERY RESPONSE DUE 
REVIEW AND REVISE SAME. 
CONF WITH DAVID BROADBENT RE CONTINUED 
LACK OF RESPONSE FROM GUY TH OMAS AND 
HOLLAND RE 
FROM GUY THOMAS 
2 . 20 
1 . 50 
.50 
• 50 
308.00 
210.00 
70.00 
70.00 
1 .00 
. 70 
14 0.00 
98. 00 
(Continued on p a j> e ? ) 
EXHIBIT A 
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Page 2 
Inv# -043610 
Date 8/31/96 
01 1653.000006-DKB 
HOURS AMOUNT 
WHETHER WE SHOULD INITIATE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS. RECEIVE SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE SIGNED BY PHILIP MONTGOMERY. 
PREPARE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ETC. 1.20 168.00 
Total Services 7.60 $1064.00 
R S YOUNG - 7.60 x 140.00 = 1064.00 
PHOTOCOPIES 7.60 
LONG DISTANCE CHARGES .40 
Total Expenses $8.00 
TOTAL THIS INVOICE $1072.00 
EXHIBIT A 
Page 2- o f > ^ 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH - SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Telephone-801/52 4-1000 
Page 
Inv# 
Date 
011653 
1 
-044159 
9/30/96 
000006-DKB 
MONTFORD-APOLLO SUGAR HOUSE LP 
% WESTFIELD PROPERTIES INC 
2681 E PARLEYS WAY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109 
Re THOMAS, GUY L 
HOURS AMOUNT 
K 9/ 12/96 RSY 
F 9/ 13/96 RSY 
p 9/16/96 RSY 
A 9/18/96 RSY 
f\ 9/19/96 RSY 
BEGIN INITIAL DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
PREPARE LETTER TO JUDGE IWASAKI RE 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND ENCLOSE 
COURTESY COPY OF MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
MOTION. RESEARCH RE EFFECT OF UTAH LAW 
ON FAILURE TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION. DICTATE POINT I OF ARGUMENT 
SECTION OF MEMORANDUM RE EFFECT OF 
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION. 
FINALIZE LETTER TO JUDGE IWASAKI WITH 
COURTESY COPY OF MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT. WORK ON 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
REVIEW LEASE AGREEMENT, LEASE 
ASSIGNMENT, LEASE EXTENSION AGREEMENT, 
GUARANTY AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RE MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. INITIAL DRAFT OF 
POINT II RE AMOUNTS DUE AND SUBJECT TO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
REVIEW AND REVISE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. TELE 
CONF WITH BR1GHAM BLACK OF WESTFIELD 
PROPERTIES RE CALCULATION OF RENT AND 
OTHER AMOUNTS DUE 
ARGUMENT SECTION 
9/?}/9(> nSY PREPARE FOR AND A' 
EXHIBIT 
DICTATE POINT II OF 
IN!) HEARING IN JUDGE 
A 
3 .80 438.37 
3.80 438.33 
80 92 . 28 
3 . 20 369 . 12 
2 .90 3 3 4.52 
(Continued on pag o 2) 
A 9/24/96 RSY 
A 9/25/96 RSY 
A 9/26/96 RSY 
A 9/30/96 RSY 
EXHIBIT A 
Page <4 of /y 
S COURT ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
SUPPORT 
TELE 
RE 
IWASAKI1 
DEFAULT. 
REVIEW AND REVISE MEMORANDUM IN 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
CONFS WITH WESTFIELD PROPERTIES 
PERSONNEL, INCLUDING BRIGHAM BLACK 
SAME. 
REVIEW AND REVISE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. DRAFT 
AFFIDAVITS OF KRAIG ERICKSON AND 
BRIGHAM BLACK. PREPARE FAX TO KRAIG 
ERICKSON AND BRIGHAM BLACK RE SAME. 
TELE CONFS WITH KRAIG ERICKSON AND 
BRIGHAM BLACK RE REVISIONS TO 
AFFIDAVITS. CONF WITH DAVID BROADBENT 
RE SAME. REVISE AFFIDAVITS. PREPARE 
FAX TO WESTFIELD PROPERTIES. 
FINALIZE FAX TO KRAIG ERICKSON AND 
BRIGHAM BLACK RE AFFIDAVITS. MAKE 
FINAL REVISIONS TO MEMORANDUM AND 
AFFIDAVITS. TELE CONF WITH BRIGHAM 
BLACK TO OBTAIN OKAY ON FORM OF 
AFFIDAVITS. PREPARE MOTION ITSELF, 
LETTERS TO KRAIG ERICKSON, BRIGHAM 
BLACK AND KENT HOLLAND. .FINALIZE 
EVERYTHING FOR FILING. 
TELE CONF WITH KENT HOLLAND RE GUY 
THOMAS SITUATION. RETURN CALL. 
TOTAL SERVICES REFLECTS A $700.00 
DISCOUNT. 
Page 
Inv# 
Date 
011653 
HOURS 
2.00 
-044159 
9/30/96 
000006-DKB 
AMOUNT 
230. 70 
3.50 403.73 
2 . 50 288.38 
2 . 20 253 . 77 
3 . 50 403.73 
R S YOUNG 
PHOTOCOPIES 
POSTAGE/SHIPPING COSTS 
TELECOPIER 
.20 23.07 
Total Services 28.40 $3276.00 
28.40 x 115.35 = 3275.94 
38. 20 
6 .00 
9 .00 
Total Expenses $53 . 20 
TOTAL THIS INVOICE $3329.20 
EXHIBIT^ A 
EXHIBIT A 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH - SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Telephone-801/524-1000 
Page 
Inv# 
Date 
011653 
1 
-044752 
10/31/96 
000006-DKB 
MONTFORD-APOLLO SUGAR HOUSE LP 
% WESTFIELD PROPERTIES INC 
2681 E PARLEYS WAY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109 
Re: THOMAS, GUY L 
HOURS AMOUNT 
A 10/01/96 RSY 
f> 10/03/96 RSY 
10/04/96 RSY 
10/08/96 RSY 
10/09/96 RSY 
10/18/96 RSY 
TELE CONF WITH KENT HOLLAND RE VARIOUS 
ISSUES, INCLUDING HIS REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. AGREE ON 
ADDITIONAL SEVEN DAYS. PREPARE LETTER 
TO KENT HOLLAND RE SAME. 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW SIGNED AFFIDAVITS 
FROM KRAIG ERICKSON AND BRIGHAM BLACK. 
PREPARE LETTER TO KENT HOLLAND RE SAME. 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW PROPOSED ORDER 
SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT. PREPARE LETTER 
TO ROBERT BOOKER RE SAME. 
INITIAL DRAFT OF FIRST DISCOVERY 
REQUEST TO MIKE BROWN AND THE BROWN 
BEAR INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION. 
TELE CONF WITH ROBERT BOOKER RE 
DIFFICULTIES LOCATING MIKE BROWN IN 
ITALY. REVIEW FILE MATERIALS RE TIME 
FOR $200 PAYMENT. 
TELE CONF WITH ROBERT BOOKER RE 
SCHEDULE FOR DELIVERING $200 FROM MIKE 
BROWN. RETURN CALL TO DISCUSS MATTER 
AND TIME FOR FILING ANSWER TO 
COMPLAINT. 
INITIAL REVIEW OF CASE LAW ON THE 
ISSUES OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
RAISING A DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 
A MEMORANDUM OPPOSING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. DICTATE INITIAL 
1 . 20 168.00 
2. 20 
2 . 50 
50 
308.00 
350.00 
70.00 
20 28.00 
(Continued on page 2) 
E3»!BIT d. 
f\ 10/21/96 RSY 
A 10/22/96 RSY 
A 10/23/96 RSY 
10/29/96 RSY 
Page 2 
Inv# -044752 
Date 10/31/96 
011653.000006-DKB 
HOURS AMOUNT 
DRAFT OF REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
REVIEW AND REVISE INITIAL DRAFT OF 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
REVIEW AND MAKE FINAL REVISIONS TO 
INITIAL DRAFT OF REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
PREPARE NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION. 
REVIEW AND FINALIZE REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
FINALIZE NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION. 
CONF WITH DAVID BROADBENT RE STATUS OF 
CASE AND DESIRES OF CLIENT RE SAME. 
PREPARE LETTER TO ROBERT BOOKER RE 
PAYMENT OF $200 AND ANSWER TO 
COMPLAINT. 
2. 50 
1 .30 
1 . 10 
30 
80 
Total Services 12 .60 
350.00 
182.00 
154.00 
42 .00 
112.00 
$1764.00 
R S YOUNG 
PHOTOCOPIES 
TELECOPIER 
12.60 x 140.00 = 
Total Expenses 
1764.00 
28.80 
3 .00 
$31 .80 
TOTAL THIS INVOICE $ 1 7 9 5 . 8 0 
EXH18lT^jL_ 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH - SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Telephone-801/52A-1000 
Page 1 
Inv# -045056 
Date 11/30/96 
011653.000006-DKB 
MONTFORD-APOLLO SUGAR HOUSE LP 
% WESTFIELD PROPERTIES INC 
2681 E PARLEYS WAY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109 
Re: THOMAS. GUY L 
HOURS AMOUNT 
1 1/04/96 RSY 
11/08/96 RSY 
11/19/96 RSY 
TELE CONF WITH BRIGHAM BLACK TO DISCUSS 
STATUS OF LITIGATION AGAINST MICHAEL 
BROWNt THE BROWN BEAR INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION AND GUY THOMAS. ALSO 
DISCUSSED POTENTIAL EVICTION OF ANOTHER 
TENANT. 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW LETTER FROM ROBERT 
BOOKER CONTAINING CHECK FOR $200 AND 
REQUESTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO ANSWER 
COMPLAINT. PREPARE LETTER TO ROBERT 
BOOKER RE SAME. 
TELE CONF WITH LUANN, JUDGE IWASAKI'S 
ASSISTANT, TO CONFIRM THAT AS OF THIS 
MORNING NO ANSWER FILED BY MIKE BROWN 
OR THE BROWN BEAR INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION. BEGIN INITIAL DRAFT OF 
REVISED DEFAULT JUDGEMENTS AGAINST MIKE 
BROWN AND THE BROWN BEAR INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION IN ANTICIPATION OF FILING 
MOTION TO REINSTATE DEFAULT. RECEIVE 
AND REVIEW ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND 
CROSSCLAIM OF MIKE BROWN AND BROWN BEAR 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION. PREPARE 
LETTER TO KRAIG ERICKSON AND BRIGHAM 
BLACK RE RECEIPT OF THE ANSWER AND 
REQUESTING THEIR ASSISTANCE IN 
RESPONDING TO THE INDIVIDUAL 
ALLEGATIONS THEREOF. 
EYM :AS 
Pao* 
A 
20 28.00 
80 112.00 
3.50 490.00 
(Continued on page 2) 
Of 
EKH1BIT 4-
Paca. 'f of. M 
Page 2 
Inv# -045056 
Date 11/30/96 
011653.000006-DKB 
HOURS AMOUNT 
R S YOUNG 
PHOTOCOPIES 
Total Services A.50 $630.00 
A.50 x 140.00 = 630.00 
.20 
Total Expenses $.20 
TOTAL THIS INVOICE $ 6 3 0 . 2 0 
EXHIB 
^ 
4 
Page % oN % 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONTFORD APOLLO SUGARHOUSE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
BROWN BEAR INTERNATIONAL 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 960902088 CN 
DATE 12/09/96 
HONORABLE GLENN K IWASAKI 
COURT REPORTER VIDEO TAPE 
COURT CLERK JMB 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
P. ATTY. YOUNG, ROBERT 
D. ATTY, HOLLAND, J. KENT 
THIS CASE COMES BEFORE THE COURT ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. 
BASED UPON THE REPRESENTATION OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, COURT 
ORDERS THE FOLLOWING: 
1) THE REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, EVEN THOUGH FILED BELATELY 
IS DEEMED TO BE ADMITTED; 
2) MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER IS ALLOWED; 
3) MR HOLLAND IS TO FILE THE AMENDED ANSWER WITHIN 10 DAYS; 
4) MR YOUNG IS AWARDED ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY FEES IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $350.00 AND ANY ATTORNEY FEES APPROPRIATE ON 
FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
5) MR YOUNG IS DIRECTED TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE ORDER. 
EXHIBIT _ ? L 
Pago ____/ of 
R O * C « T K. YCATCS 
«K>N C. MCATON 
J O H N * . A t H T O N 
fMCHAKO C t L A N C K 
J O H N M. #«AOl .CY 
O, WAY C A M 6 L C 
C- C«A«G U U C N O U t S T 
W, I U N O A L L C A U 
J O H N * , C H I N O t U N O 
C C O f T B C t W. M A N C U N 
J A M C t A. » O C V t « 3 
OAV40 K. » * O A O « C N T 
THOMAS J . f A K N 
•4. OAVtO CC*C*S<-CY 
« 0 » C « T C , W«NG 
C A « L W. t A M T O N 
W C O O ^ T C UNOCCT 
feAUJY I U C K M«M(NIMCt 
« O O C « J. M<CONKlC 
RO«CRT » . YOUNG 
•44CHACL O. M<CUCCY1 
CL IZA9CTH M. R C C * 
T H O M A S R. AAATON 
U t A O. CUffTtN 
P R I N C E , Y E A T E S & G E L D Z A H L E R 
A # A O f C t i < O N A i C C * * 0 « A T » O N 
L A W Y E R S 
CITY CENTRE I , SUITE OOO 
175 EAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CCTY, UTAH 8-4MI 
TELEPHONE (6O0 52-4-IOOO 
TAX (60<) 524-IOC8 
t «CO4«TC«C0 NkTCMT ATTO*NCY 
RARK CITY orr«ce 
614 MAIN STREET 
••ARK CITY, UTAH 6<4 0 e 0 
<«0<) •<4C-7<4*0 
August 15,1996 
or couNttL 
CYCC M, WAftO 
* C N N C T N A. O K A I A K I , * . C . 
V«CTO« A. f O U A K 
« A « K O. VAN W A G O N C * 
o r C O U N S C L 
MOYLt X. DRAPER, P.C. 
WAHOtN A. WH(TNCY 
•JOSC^M J . P A t M C R 
O. WOOD M O Y L C l« 
WAYNC G. FCTTY 
ROYAL I. H A N S E N 
r. ft. ^f»(NCC («OlO-l©Ol) 
OAVIO ft. C t L O Z A M L C R ( 1 0 3 2 - 1 0 0 4 ) 
J. Kent Holland, Esq. 
Anderson & Holland 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643 
Re: Mont)rord-Apollo Sugarhouse v. Thomas, et aL 
Dear Kent: 
My file indicates we served your client with a first set of Requests for Admission, 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on July 9, 1996. Even with a few days 
for service by mail, your client's response is overdue. 
As you know, Rule 36, pertaining to Requests for Admission, provides "the matters 
shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days of service . . . . " 
Please be advised that we intend to move for summary judgment, based upon the admission of each 
of the Requests for Admission contained in our July 9 discovery request, if your client does not 
respond to the discovery within the next ten days. If there is any misunderstanding about this or you 
would otherwise like to discuss the matter, please call. 
Sincerely, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
RSY/dg 
cc: Kraig Erickson 
David Broadbent 
Robert S. Youn 
*^xA*r**r>*»oo«Jtxjr MOULAXXX* n 
EXHIBIT 6 
Pao^ ' - d 
take the exclusive possession of the same and to use the same, rent or charge 
free, until all defaults are cured or, at its option, at any time during the terra 
of this Lease, to require Tenant to forthwith remove the same. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, Landlord agreec to <ax©cut« a reasonable subordination agreement 
as may be rehired by a lender providing a fixture, improvement, or operational 
loan to Tenant. 
18.06 Impracticality of Curing Default. Notwithstanding any other 
provisions of this Article, the Landlord agrees that if the default complained 
of, other than for the payment of money or the events of default referred to in 
Section 18.01 (b), is of such a nature that the same cannot be cured within the 
thirty (30) day period requiring such curing as specified in the written notice 
relating thereto, then such default shall be deemed to be cured if the Tenant 
within such period of thirty (30) days shall have commenced the curing thereof 
and shall continue thereafter with all due diligence to cause such curing and 
does so complete the same with the use of such diligence as aforesaid. 
18.07 Waiver of Trial by Jury. Tenant hereby waives any and all right to 
a trial by jury in any suit or suits brought to enforce any provisions of this 
lease or arising out of or concerning the provisions of this Lease. 
18.08 Payment of Expenses. Upon the occurrence of an event of default, 
Tenant shall pay all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees and 
legal expenses, incurred by Landlord in enforcing or exercising any remedies 
under this Lease. 
18.09 Additional Remedies. The remedies given to the Landlord in this 
Article shall be in addition and supplemental to all other rights or remedies 
which the Landlord may have under the laws then in force. 
XIX. MISCELLANEOUS 
19.01 Notices. Any notice, demand, request or other instrument which may 
be or is required to be given under this Lease shall be delivered in person, sent 
by facsimile transmission with a copy by regular mail, or sent by United States 
certified mail postage prepaid and shall be addressed (a) if to Landlord at the 
address first hereinabove given or at such other address as Landlord may 
designate by written notice and (b) if to Tenant at the Premises or at such other 
address as Tenant shall designate by written notice (c) if to Lender at such 
address as referenced in Article I or at such other address as Landlord or Lender 
may designate by written notice to Tenant. 
19.02 Attorney's Fees. In the event that either the Landlord or the Tenant 
shalj institute any action or proceeding against the other relating to the 
provisions of this Lease, or any default hereunder, then, and in that event, the 
unsuccessful party in such action or proceeding agrees to reimburse the 
successful party for the reasonable expenses of such action including reasonable 
attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred therein by the successful party. 
19.03 Binding on Successors. All rights and liabilities herein given to, 
or imposed upon, the respective parties hereto shall extend to and bind the 
several respective heirs, executors, administrators, assigns and successors of 
the said parties; and if there shall be more than one tenant, they shall all be 
bound jointly and severally by the terms, covenants and agreements herein. No 
rights, however, shall inure to the benefit of any assignee of Tenant unless the 
assignment to such assignee has been approved by Landlord in writing as provided 
in Article VIII hereof. 
19.04 No Partnership. Landlord does not, in any way or for any purpose, 
become a partner of Tenant in the conduct of its business, or otherwise, or joint 
venturer, or a member of a joint enterprise with Tenant- The provisions of this 
Lease relating to the percentage rent payable hereunder are included solely for 
Te nant's Initials: 
EXHIBIT ^ Landlord's Initials: J ^ 2 l . 
— • • • • - .HIITirT:! - 2 8 -
Pa<ia I of ) 
